MAR 1952 51-4C Approved For Release 1999/09/28 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500750049-3

SECURITY INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO

INFORMATION FROM

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

CD NO.

COUNTRY COMMUNIST CHINA

SUBJECT

INDICATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES

INFORMATION

DATE OF May 25-31, 1953

HOW

**PUBLISHED** 

DATE DIST. 24 June 1953

WHERE

**PUBLISHED** 

NO. OF PAGES

DATE

**PUBLISHED** 

LANGUAGE

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

THE UNITED STATES, BITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE IS, SECTIONS 782 IND 784, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON I

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Monitored Broadcasts

CPW Report No. 76-A -- COMMUNIST CHINA

(May 25 - 31, 1953)

SUMMARY

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## SUMMARY

The Sino-Soviet riendship Association utilizes International Children's Day to promote Russian propaganda through pictures, movies, and plays, while the Communist Party pushes enrolment of children and youth in Communist organizations. The Party, stressing a study of the Soviet Communist Party, concentrates on classes for special groups such as teachers and Overseas Chinese. Broadcast in full of the May 24 PRAVDA editorial, even over regional stations, promotes Moscow's peace offensive, while new emphasis on alleged Soviet interest in Chinese art and literature attempts to make Russian views and attitudes more palatable. Meanwhile, with more direct infiltration, Russian experts reclaim unproductive Kansu oil wells, abandoned Honan coal mines, and push toward completion of the Lanchow-Sian Highway, linking the heart of China more closely with the USSR.

Steps to arouse greater interest in the Resist-America, Aid-Korea campaign and new efforts to assist Chinese People's Volunteers: dependents indicate the extent of war burdens. Claims also are made that some Chinese war supplies are used to feed Koreans and reconstruct Korean buildings.

Use of "Ankang" apparently is avoided, with "Anshan" again used in referring to Soviet-controlled industrial centers near the city, suggesting that this Russification move was not popular. Other evidence of lack of enthusiasm is seen in industrial reorganizations "to allow for better inspection"; an increase in power industry accidents; refusal to take informers! letters seriously; and failures of "trade meetings" or fairs to promote commerce, apparently because of a peasant boycott. Direct resistance is disclosed by suppression of 10 Shanghai religious organizations, with the arrest and "severe punishment" of their leaders, accused of promoting fantastic espionage plots.

Delay in building the Sinkiang radio propaganda network is disclosed, with only 70 of the planned 600 monitoring posts in operation. Broadcasting is in Chinese as well as Uighur, possibly so Party henchmen can keep a close check. Despite claims of local cooperation, road construction, and successful farming operations in Tibet, it is admitted that supplies are air-dropped to People's Liberation Army units in Lhasa.

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